Political Economy of Climate (In)Action

Thiemo Fetzer

MEGEO

06/10/2023



European Research Council Established by the European Commission

erc

I am going to try to fill some gaps here

On the corrosive effect of crisis

breeding short-termism

A tale of two countries

informational and performative state capacity

Political economy in action

make action incentive compatible

On austerity, Brexit and the long arc of protest


the gaps in between

Transnational dimension

(c) Thiemo Fetzer


data, code and capabilities

On the corrosiveness of crises



From a talk at the New School, March 2023 and internal Warwick presentation 2022.






Policy response typically


- Regressive in nature
- Facilitating or encouraging outright fraud
- Benefiting larger firms more than smaller firms
- Further eroding state capacity
- Further skewing relative prices (intergenerationally, and intra-generationally)

⁽c) Thiemo Fetzer



Fixing costly policy errors

- Political right offers austerity and tax cuts further eroding state capacity
- Political left offers
 expropriation, abolishment
 of market principles
- Both mark a departure from liberal economic order
- Both run risk of producing authoritarianism



- Erosion of trust and corrosion of resilience
- Voluntary political disengagement
- Rise of extreme individualism
- Deaths of despair
- •••

Political economy of policy failures

• We didn't have the right data.

- Ask yourself, why we don't have the right data or
- In this case, much of the data is right there just not timely and not readily available to researchers

• There wasn't enough time.

• This is a quite predictable crisis (winter is coming) and politics is not surprising us on upside

• We didn't have the evidence.

- Cacophony of evidence produced by **influence industry**
- True expertise often doesn't have **vector of access** or **lack of incentives**
- Data rich environment enables evaluation to adjust policies along the way

What about a predictable crisis?



Russian invasion of Ukraine rocked energy markets

- In spring 2022, it was perfectly predictable that energy prices would not drop anytime soon.
- Escalation in Ukraine is just **continued hybrid warfare** since 2008/2009
- And: it is not desirable for hydrocarbon-based energy prices to go down if we want climate action
- But of course, entrenched preferences for status quo and concerns over stability led to countries to adopt a broad range of measures to take out the sting


Predictable crisis is an opportunity for positive research

- 1. To holding politics to account **in near real time**
- 2. Using **positive research** carried out to highest standard of integrity


I am trying to establish a new way of doing research: *real time research*.

Statistical zeroes are sexy


 \rightarrow Politics should not be just crisis management but forward looking




From: Fetzer et al (2023) Boundaries of the State, mimeo.Fetzer



From: Fetzer et al (2023) Boundaries of the State, mimeo.Fetzer



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
Policy response to energy crisis

- UK approach: targeted but highly distortionary
- DE approach: untargeted but nondistortionary

But: German response invokes informational state capacity

untargeted lump sum transfer passed through the tax system

Both struggle with **performative state capacity** (H/T austerity)



From: Fetzer et al (2023) Boundaries of the State, mimeo.

Political Economy in Action?

Focus on UK policy response to energy crisis




From: Fetzer (2023) Beyond the Energy Price Guarantee With or without? Presented October 2022.


Millions of data points, arbitrary spatial aggregations

- Down to the property level.
- Using moment matching, energy efficiency data and granular property level data
- I knocked this together in 6 weeks
- So any prudential, forward looking government actor should have been able to do that as well, wouldn't you think?


Outlet: Financial Times.



Millions of data points, arbitrary spatial aggregations



Open Data enabled development of ex-ante impact modeling framework



Shared in August 2022, final data shared early October 2022 only published 6 weeks later a day after Chancellor announced retrofit package.

Why is this "explosive"?

Well, in essence you can really "zoom in" and even attach a **picture** to the data.

Spatial **inequalities** have never become more **salient**.

Demand for privacy is originating in **distrust** of state to fulfill its core function.

But privacy also facilitates corruption.

Informational rents are huge.



So, @Jeremy_Hunt now did a full and welcome u-turn on the #minibudget2022. And they are starting to tackle another policy that needs fixing, the #EnergyPriceguarantee #EPG. Why should this happen? This is a story that can ultimately be summarised in these two pictures.... 1/..



Peter Jukes and 7 others

4:49 pm · 17 Oct 2022

119 Reposts 22 Quotes 326 Likes 45 Bookmarks

De-facto pre-registration of a "natural" experiment

How does untargeted energy price support – arising from a lack of performative and informational state capacity due to the difficulty in navigating privacy can cause endogenous crisis narratives.

- 1. Endogenous crime
- 2. Endogenous excess mortality
- 3. Endogenous deprivation
- 4. Endogenous instability
- 5. ...
- \rightarrow plus a few more things I can not yet talk about....

One example of such a paper

Thiemo Fetzer Image: - same handle elsewhere @fetzert

Today, in England, millions of voters make a choice in their #LocalElections2023. It's a good time to share some new research that is related to two policy issues that will have touched many people over the last year: the #energycrisis & #crime.

buff.ly/3Vys0w7

Did the policy response to the energy crisis cause crime? Evidence from England

Thiemo Fetzer*

May 4, 2023

Abstract


The invasion of Ukraine has led to an unprecedented increase in energy prices in much of Western Europe with policy makers actively intervening in energy markets to cushion the shock. The UK's policy response stands out: the energy price guarantee (EPG) was entirely untargeted and is, in real terms, much less generous to those living in properties with low energy efficiency. Using granular data and following a documented research approach this paper documents that areas more exposed to the energy price shock saw a notable increase in burglaries and anti-social behaviour: the energy price shock is responsible for a 6 to 10 percent increase in burglaries and a 9 to 24 percent increase in police reported anti-social behaviour between October 2022 to March 2023 inclusive. A quantification of policy alternatives suggests that a more targeted energy support package and/or a more energy efficient housing stock could have resulted in a drastically less pronounced uptick in crime.

Keywords: CRIME, WELFARE, INSTABILITY, CLIMATE CRISIS, COST-OF-LIVING JEL Classification: Q40, Q48, K42


Why?

A simple theoretical framework (sketch)


- model the policymaker's problem in deciding on a policy response to the energy crisis
- Consumers are heterogeneous in their income and therefore their demand for energy, assuming that energy is a normal good
- A policymaker has a fixed, **exogenously determined budget** to split between lump-sum transfers and a subsidy program
- The policymaker has exogenous preferences over the transfer that each consumer type receives, and only imperfectly observes each consumer's type.
- This provides a tractable framework to analyze the trade-off between efficiency, redistribution and the benefit of higher informational capacity and how these outcomes are affected by policymakers' preferences



From: Fetzer, Edenhofer and Sha₩¹(202³)²Boundaries of the State, mimeo.




From: Fetzer, Edenhofer and Shaw (2023) Boundaries of the State, mimeo.



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The Unholy Coalition in relative terms


- Conservative party support in US and UK majoritarian systems are governed by what I call an "unholy coalition"
- Conservative leaning voters face, relative to nonconservative leaning supporters, higher relative energy bills
- Source of inefficiencies



From: Fetzer, Edenhofer and Shaw (2023) Boundaries of the (c) Thiemo Fetzer State, mimeo.

The Unholy Coalition in levels

- In levels, it actually is a hockey stick.
- Disproportionately higher energy bills in levels among conservative supporters in highest income percentile
- And this is from individual level survey data that is unlikely to have dense sample on high income tail
- HANK meets PE



From: Fetzer, Edenhofer and Shaw (2023) Boundaries of the (c) ThiemoState, mimeo.


Let us look at some of the correlates

• Variation in bills that households face

$Var(\Delta p_i \times f(Who_i, what_i, how_i))$

- Variance in energy consumption is non-linear there is a correlation structure.
- Lump sum transfer allows relative prices to adjust -- German intervention
- UK intervention was direct intervention in price setting mechanism


Looking at the median household



- This is looking at explanatory power these are not regression coefficients
- This is asking: what characteristics of an area or its residents are correlated with higher exposure to energy bills before and/or after
- We see non-uniform shrinkage


From: Fetzer, Gazze and Bishop (2023). Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to energy price shocks

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Synthesis

- Absence of informational and performative state capacity coupled with the political economy of an unholy coalition results in poorly designed public policies
- German approach on paper gets close to first best, UK approach is either the product of its lack of performative or informational state capacity OR the result of its political economy
- Hope to extend this type of work to other countries where we can evaluate performative state capacity
- Research and researchers can play a **vital role going forward** and should establish monitoring and evaluation frameworks.
- UK right now working on a **climate action monitoring framework**.

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On austerity, Brexit and the long arc of protest

Austerity post global financial crisis

- Austerity was a **rational response** in wake of global financial crisis due to fiscal imbalances
- Some elements of a design of austerity was very much consistent with **climate action** (housing sector reallocation)
- But incidence of that shock was disproportionately on the vulnerable


But:

- Austerity in wake of technological shock and ongoing structural change is dangerous as **public sector** may not develop capabilities
- performative state capacity is eroded further

Example of austerity policy consistent with climate action



What did the bedroom tax do?



From: Fetzer (2019). Did Austerity Cause Brexit?c) Thiemo Fetzer

Exacerbated local economic decline and visible changes



From: Fetzer (2020). Perceptions of Local Decline and Populism, unfinished manuscript.

Brexit is incredibly costly

- Almost across the board it is hard to argue that the UK is "doing well" with Brexit too date
- Massive and widening output gap with exacerbating regional differences
- West Midlands and industrial heartlands see biggest adjustment (car industry...)
- Adjustments may not be inconsistent with potential reallocation needed for climate action
- Northern Ireland is indeed getting "the best deal"


	Region	Ensemble		"Best synthetic control"		
ITL1		\hat{y}^{ENS}	$\hat{y}_{d}^{ENS_{sim}}$	AAPEs	RMSPE _s	MAPE
Panel	A: Average post 2016					
TLC	North East	-5.93	-5.46	-6.41	-5.09	-5.1
TLD	North West	-7.00	-5.86	-7.00	-4.74	-4.6
TLE	Yorkshire and The Humber	-5.08	-5.08	-5.08	-3.33	-3.4
TLF	East Midlands	-6.97	-6.97	-6.97	-4.50	-4.4
TLG	West Midlands	-7.64	-8.03	-8.03	-7.67	-7.6
TLH	East	-4.13	-4.63	-4.52	-4.10	-4.1
TLI	London	-7.45	-5.93	-6.57	-6.43	-6.4
TLJ	South East	-4.62	-4.18	-4.62	-3.88	-3.8
TLK	South West	-5.44	-5.66	-5.44	-4.57	-4.5
TLL	Wales	-6.03	-6.12	-6.12	-5.06	-5.0
TLM	Scotland	-6.52	-6.66	-6.52	-5.91	-5.8
TLN	Northern Ireland	-1.72	-1.72	-1.72	-1.35	-1.4
Panel	B: Average in 2022					
TLC	North East	-8.52	-7.46	-9.77	-7.48	-7.5
TLD	North West	-9.58	-7.98	-9.58	-6.07	-5.9
TLE	Yorkshire and The Humber	-7.28	-7.28	-7.28	-4.53	-4.7
TLF	East Midlands	-11.80	-11.80	-11.80	-7.30	-7.2
TLG	West Midlands	-14.27	-15.14	-15.14	-14.17	-14.0
TLH	East	-7.11	-8.32	-8.15	-7.53	-7.5
TLI	London	-10.39	-7.93	-9.20	-8.58	-8.5
TLJ	South East	-6.46	-5.28	-6.46	-5.50	-5.5
TLK	South West	-9.17	-9.61	-9.17	-7.51	-7.5
TLL	Wales	-10.68	-10.64	-10.64	-8.28	-8.2
TLM	Scotland	-9.74	-10.03	-9.74	-8.74	-8.7
TLN	Northern Ireland	-0.53	-0.53	-0.53	0.37	0.2

Notes: Table presents region-level estimates of the cost of Brexit expressed in the difference in growth rates relative to 2016Q2 between the actual UK region and the synthetic control estimate. The data capture the average difference in the respective year indicated in the column head. The preferred estimate is the ensemble average across the whole set of synthetic control estimates. We further provide the ensemble estimate constructed using the 70 synthetic controls using the sampling approach, along with the estimates that are obtained when picking the best series among the set of synthetic control according to the best pre-treatment fit as defined by equations (2)-(4).

Alabrese, Fetzer, Wang (2023)


Brexit, its roots and a reversal? A look at 2021 data published in 2023

- Leave voting areas now seem least affected by the cost of Brexit too date economically.
- Goodness of fit is quite limited though
- Pandemic excess mortality "helped" create "space"



Long arc of protest

- Places that would become Brexit vote Losers saw sharp increase in vote share for outsider parties (non LD, Lab or C) in local elections (conditional on turnout)
- Unmet demand for plurality may have been "culled" or diluted or it provides for ample mass to mess about in 2022ff
- Narrative channeling and engineering has facilitated sophisticated vote splitting strategies (UKIP, Brexit Party etc.)



Transnational Dimension

Why is global action necessary?

Climate crisis can trigger mechanisms that are yet **unknown**.

It is not just a risk to **individuals** or **communities**


It is an **uncertainty shock** which may **cause system ruptures**


die **Spreu** wird sich vom **Weizen** trennen Mt 3,12

It will test **the boundaries of the state** and can cause a return to **extreme isolationism**

Brexit, trade wars and actual wars are just a symptom of this

But if history has taught us anything: now is the time to facilitate rapid **exchange of ideas**, **knowledge and skills**.





mean, variance and correlation structure of weather and environmental events

What is the role that information plays?

Media and **information** is crucial in shaping **preferences**, **perceptions** and **actions**.

But it is imperative we understand how people interact with information & understand the **information filters** they employ

Knowledge versus information versus narratives versus attention may be a key battleground.


People process information in complex fashion


There are at least two main dimensions

1. Personal filters


2. Mechanic or institutional filter

These ply a crucial role in **shaping transition narratives**. The same facts and evidence may be interpreted **heterogeneously**






Mechanic and institutional filters




(c) Thiemo Fetzer

Everything everywhere all at once






Everything everywhere all at once



Incredibly close and extremely loud




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
Potential social optimum is a mixture





Let me walk you through a few examples

Mental models as a policy constraint



\rightarrow ensuing preying on vulnerable individuals around COVID19 policy response

Source: Fetzer, Hensel, Hermle & Roth (2020) Coronavirus Perceptionsrand Economic Anxiety, Review of Economics and Statistics.

Selective attention as an action constraint

Disaster type	Number of disasters	Share of disasters	Killed per disaster	Affected per disaster	Share receiving OFDA relief
Flood	1,675	0.32	170	1,724,851	0.22
Storm	1,175	0.23	646	601,490	0.17
Epidemic	737	0.14	249	27,528	0.12
Earthquake	559	0.11	1,522	173,015	0.21
Drought	326	0.06	18,657	5,740,623	0.30
Landslide	310	0.06	84	38,789	0.06
Fire	129	0.02	19	69,552	0.13
Cold wave	114	0.02	103	46,656	0.01
Volcano	102	0.02	853	39,008	0.27
Infestation	47	0.01	na	1,100	0.68
Food					
shortage	38	0.01	4,293	734,630	0.13
Total	5,212	1.00	590	1,166,505	0.19

SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISASTERS

\rightarrow resulting weaponization of narratives around selective aid provision

Source: Stromberg (2005) News Droughts, News Floods and US disastiemrelief, Quarterly Journal of Economics.


Domestic politics as a narrative constraint



 \rightarrow control of domestic media landscape creates hold up problem in transnational settings

Source: Fetzer (2020) MEGEO ERC Starting Grant Proposal


Terrorism weaponizing an information channel



\rightarrow targeted violence against NATO soldiers as strategy to weaponize domestic media

Source: Fetzer et al. - 2020 - Losing on the home front: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan

Terrorism weaponizing an information channel



→ Soldier deaths generate headlines differentially across NATO troop sending countries


Source: Fetzer et al. - 2020 - Losing on the home front: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan

Selective attention as driver of beliefs



Source: Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2020) "How Big Is the Media Multiplier Zevidence from Dyadic Data"


Selective attention as driver of beliefs



\rightarrow feeding narratives of violence, instability or excessive risks


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Calibration of model of media multiplier




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
Source: Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2020) "How Big Is the Media Multiplier Evidence from Dyadic Data"

Cross border media focus




Source: Based on Factiva classification of geographical aboutness of articles across main local language media sources from Fetzer (2020) MEGEO ERC Starting Grant Proposal

Domestic media or news filters




Source: Fetzer (2020) MEGEO ERC Starting Grant Proposal (c) Th

News selection function




Source: Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2020) "How Big Is the Media Multiplier zevidence from Dyadic Data"

Non-reporting on extreme weather events



Source: Fetzer (2020) MEGEO ERC Starting Grant (Groposa Based on Factiva raw article counts classified as speaking to Climate Change or Global Warming.

Media focus is limited by the boundaries of the state



Source: Fetzer (2020) MEGEO ERC Starting Grant Proposal Based on Factiva classification of geographical aboutness of articles focusing on sample of news sources from a set of countries.

back

What needs to happen?

Data, code and capabilities

De-weaponization of the information sphere

- **1. Earth observation capabilities** so we can share and compare data across countries
- 2. Peer monitoring and **open-source intelligence**
- 3. Professionalization of **translators**
- 4. Reinvigoration of **local journalism**

Deeds matter more than words